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Abstract. If we adopt a supervaluational semantics for vagueness, what sort of logic results? As it 
turns out, the answer depends crucially on how the standard notion of validity as truth preservation 
is recasted. There are several ways of doing that within a supervaluational framework, the main 
alternative being between ‘global’ construals (e.g., an argument is valid if and only if it preserves 
truth-under-all-precisifications) and ‘local’ construals (an argument is valid if and only if, under 
all precisifications, it preserves truth). The former alternative is by far more popular, but I argue in 
favour of the latter, for (i) it does not suffer from a number of serious objections, and (ii) it makes 
it possible to restore global validity as a defined notion.  
 
 
Supervaluationism is a mixed bag. It is sometimes described as the ‘standard’ 
theory of vagueness, at least insofar as vagueness is construed as a semantic phe-
nomenon, but exactly what that standard theory amounts to is far from clear. In 
fact, it’s pretty clear that there isn’t just one supervaluational semantics out 
there—there are lots of such semantics; and although it is true that they all exploit 
the same insight, their relative differences are by no means immaterial. For one 
thing, a lot depends on how exactly supervaluations are constructed, that is, on 
how exactly we come to establish the truth-value of a given statement. (And when 
I say that a lot depends on this I mean to say that different explanations may give 
rise to different philosophical worries, or justify different reactions.) Secondly, 
and equally importantly, a lot depends on how a given supervaluationary machin-
ery is brought into play when it comes to explaining the logic of the language, 
that is, not the notion of truth, or ‘super-truth’, as it applies to individual state-
ments, but the notion of validity, or ‘super-validity’, as it applies to whole argu-
ments. (I am thinking for instance of how different explanations may bear on the 
question of whether, or to what extent, vagueness involves a departure from clas-
sical logic.) Here I want to focus on this second part of the story. However, since 
the notion of validity depends on the notion of truth—or so one may argue—I 
also want to comment briefly on the first. 
1. Precisifications and Supervaluations  
I take it that the basic insight of any supervaluationary semantics boils down to 
the following two thoughts: first, a vague language is one that admits of several 
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precisifications; second, when a language admits of several precisifications, its 
semantics is fixed only insofar as—and exactly insofar as—all those precisifi-
cations agree. In particular, the semantic value of a statement is fixed only inso-
far as there is complete agreement on that value: the statement is true if it is 
super-true, that is, true on every admissible precisification, and it is false if it is 
super-false, that is, false on every admissible precisification; otherwise it has no 
semantic value. All of this, of course, presupposes that we know how to figure out 
the value of a statement on a precisification, but that’s part of the idea: preci-
sifications are semantically standard, hence our standard semantic algorithms ap-
ply just fine. So the idea is that when several precisifications are equally ad-
missible, we apply those algorithms several times and then see what happens: If 
we come up with different answers—too bad; but if the answer is always the 
same, if our statement always gets the same value, then we can rest content, since 
our lack of precision turns out to be immaterial. Different admissible precisi-
fications induce different admissible valuations, none of which can trump the 
others; but the logical product of such valuations—their supervaluation—is reli-
able enough. 
Now, there are two big questions that need to be answered before we can say 
we have a full-fledged supervaluational semantics for a language L. First, how 
exactly is the notion of an admissible precisification to be cashed out? Second, 
how exactly do we cash out the notion of an admissible precisification? The sec-
ond question is notoriously a difficult one. It is difficult in practice (Michael 
Dummett, 1991, p. 74, says that here comes the ‘hard work’ when we attend to 
the semantics of a specific language) as well as in principle (since it gives rise 
to worries concerning higher-order vagueness). But the first question is also im-
portant, since the philosophical plausibility of the basic insight depends crucially 
on the answer. Just to give an idea, there are at least two main options one may 
consider:  
(1) One option is to construe a precisification of our vague language, L, as a 
precise language in its own right. (This is how Dummett and David Lewis 
put it, at least in some of their works.1) From this point of view, to say that L 
                                                
1 See for instance Lewis 1975, p. 188: ‘Our convention of language is not exactly a conven-
tion of truthfulness and trust in a single language … Rather it is a convention of truthfulness and 
trust in whichever we please of some cluster of similar languages: languages with more or less the 
same sentences … The convention confines us to the cluster, but leaves us with indeterminacies 
whenever the languages of the cluster disagree.’ Burns 1991 takes this as a starting point for an 
account of vagueness that is pragmatic, as opposed to semantic, but Lewis’s later writings indicate 
that he was thinking along supervaluationary lines.  
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admits of several precisifications is to say that L is really many languages, a 
cluster of several (homophonic) precise languages whose semantics are only 
partially in agreement: our practices have simply failed to uniquely identify 
the one language that we are speaking. Correspondingly, to say that a state-
ment of L is super-true (for instance) is to say that it is true no matter how 
we suppose L to be identified, that is, no matter which (homophonic) variant 
of our statement we consider. 
(2) A different, more popular option is to construe a precisification of a vague 
language L as a precise interpretation of L. (This is how most authors see it, 
from Kit Fine to Marian Przełeçki to the later David Lewis to Vann McGee 
and Brian McLaughlin.2) Here the idea is that the grammar of our language 
is in principle compatible with countless interpretations, countless models 
each of which is logically adequate in that each assigns an extension to every 
predicate constant, a denotation to every individual constant, etc. Our lin-
guistic practices and conventions are meant to select one such interpretation 
as the intended one, but they may fall short of doing the job properly. Corre-
spondingly, to say that a statement of L is super-true (for instance) is to say 
that it is true no matter how we suppose the job to be done properly.  
Both of these options (and there are others3) may in turn be further qualified in a 
number of ways. In particular, each of them can be qualified by further specifying 
the analytic link between the given vague language, L, and its precisifications. 
One may: 
(a) think of L as being literally defined by its precisifications (as the above for-
mulations suggest), or 
(b) think of L as being analytically prior to its precisifications, the latter being 
what we get—or would get—by replacing L’s vague words with precise 
                                                
2 See for instance McGee and McLaughlin 1995, p. 228: ‘The position we are developing 
here does not require looking at a lot of different languages, but rather looking at a lot of different 
models. The models we look at are all models of the vague language whose semantics we are try-
ing to describe’. Compare Fine 1975, p. 125, Przełeçki 1976, pp. 376f, and Lewis 1993, p. 172. 
3 For instance, a third option is to construe a precisification as an assessment of the given 
language L, that is, as a classification of every atomic L-statement as either true or false. (This is 
how Bas van Fraassen 1966 originally conceived of it, though his concern was with lack of refer-
ence rather than vagueness; see also Herzberger 1982.) The idea, in this case, is that the semantics 
of a language is characteristically identified by the truth-values of its atomic statements: we come 
to learn the meaning of a word by learning which statements containing that word are correct, i.e., 
true, and which are incorrect, i.e., false, according to the beliefs of our linguistic community. To 
the extent that these beliefs may disagree, or fail to cover every case, our language is vague.  
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ones (option 1) or by sharpening the actual interpretation of those vague 
words (option 2).4 
Moreover, each option can be further qualified by allowing for a certain leeway in 
the scope of the relevant precisifications. One may: 
(i) speak of total precisifications, that is, precisifications relative to the whole 
language (as in the above formulations), or 
(ii) speak of limited precisifications, that is, precisifications relative only to that 
portion of the language that shows up in the particular statement or state-
ments that we wish to evaluate. 
So there obviously are several distinct ways of spelling out the basic insight on 
which a semantics of this sort is erected. A supervaluation registers the pattern of 
agreement among the valuations induced by a certain class of admissible precisi-
fications, but exactly what these precisifications amount to is no straightforward 
business.  
Does it really matter which option we settle on? In a way, one may think that 
these are distinctions without a difference. What really matters, in the end, is the 
supervaluation itself, which is just a partial function from statements to truth-
values; and so long as we can establish a suitable correspondence among the rele-
vant criteria of admissibility, it is perfectly conceivable that we end up with the 
same supervaluation in all cases. Indeed, if we confine ourselves to a standard 
language—that is, a language of the sort considered in classical logical theories—
then it is easy to verify that all options yield supervaluations that are, if not iden-
tical, equivalent up to isomorphism, at least under certain conditions.5 Gener-
                                                
4 Thus, the passage from Lewis in note 1 is in the spirit of option (1)(a), but Dummett’s 
formulation is in line with (1)(b): ‘For every vague predicate, say “red”, we may consider the rela-
tion which a given predicate, say “rouge”, will have to it when “rouge” is what I shall call an ac-
ceptable sharpening of “red”’ (1991, p. 73). Likewise, McGee and McLaughlin’s account follows 
option (2)(a), but there are writers, such as Hans Kamp (1975), who explicitly go for (2)(b). 
5 To illustrate, consider options (1)(a)(i) and (2)(a)(i). Given a vague language L, it is easy 
to establish a correspondence (up to isomorphism) between the interpretations of the precise lan-
guages that qualify as precisifications of L in the first sense and the precise interpretations of L 
that qualify as precisifications in the second sense. Suppose for simplicity that L admits of just two 
precisifications in the first sense, two languages L1 and L2 that are perfect duplicates of each other 
except that the L1-interpretation of a certain predicate, F1, is slightly different from the L2-
interpretation of its duplicate, F2. Strictly speaking, L1 and L2 are distinct languages, but we are 
supposed to think of them as determining the same vague language L, so we can construe each 
pair of duplicate symbols as a single L-symbol. Accordingly, we can treat the interpretations of 
our two languages, I(L1) and I(L2), as two interpretations of the same language, I1(L) and I2(L), 
which is exactly what L’s precisifications would amount to in the second sense. Conversely, given  
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ally speaking, however, this is not enough to conclude that they all boil down 
to the same thing. There are at least two sorts of consideration that suggest the 
opposite. 
On the one hand, the identification of truth with super-truth has been at-
tacked on several grounds, and depending on how one sees the details, the re-
sponse on behalf of supervaluationism may look very different. Think, for exam-
ple, of David Sanford’s classic objection (1976, p. 206), emphatically echoed by 
Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore (1996): the very idea of explaining the semantics of 
a vague language L by looking at its admissible precisifications would be wrong-
headed. For how could we learn something about a language that is in fact vague 
by examining the semantics of its possible precisifications? Surely this objection 
has a strong appeal if we are thinking in terms of (b)-style precisifications, that is, 
precisifications construed as precise languages or interpretations that go beyond 
what we in fact have. But the objection loses its force if we are thinking in terms 
of (a)-style precisifications, that is, if we are truly identifying L with a cluster of 
precise languages or interpretations. For in that case, examining a precisification 
does not amount to examining something else than what we in fact have. As 
McGee and McLaughlin (1999) have pointed out, from this perspective the objec-
tion betrays a misconstrual of the idea that admissible interpretations must respect 
conceptual truths: there is no a priori requirement that such interpretations reflect 
every aspect of a word’s meaning, and one may insist that the semantic features of 
a vague language are global. (See also Morreau 1999.) Moreover, even with re-
spect to (b)-style precisifications, the objection loses its force if we are thinking 
along option (2) rather than option (1). By replacing L’s vague words with precise 
ones we may indeed lose track of certain distinguishing features of L: for exam-
ple, it is a ‘conceptual truth’ of English that ‘small’ has borderline cases, and this 
conceptual truth would seem to be lost in every precise variant of English. How-
ever, considering how the vague interpretation of those words can be made more 
precise need not have that effect. One can plausibly maintain that how an expres-
sion can be made precise is already part of its meaning, as Fine (1975, p. 131) put 
it: the meaning of an expression is a product of both its actual meaning (the mean-
                                                
two precise interpretations of a single vague language L, I1(L) and I2(L), we can obviously split 
each L-symbol into two duplicates and construct two different languages, L1 and L2, setting 
I(L1) = I1(L) and I(L2) = I2(L). So the two options yield isomorphic supervaluations. (The ‘certain 
conditions’ mentioned in the text concern the difference between (i)-style and (ii)-style precisifica-
tions. These can be shown to be equivalent only if we assume that all words can be simultaneously 
precisified; this assumption is part and parcel of option (i), but may be relaxed if one follows op-
tion (ii), hence the latter option may in principle yield supervaluations that are undefined with re-
spect to statements that the former option treats as super-true or super-false.) 
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ing fixed by the partial interpretation of L) and its potential meanings (the mean-
ing fixed by the complete extensions of that interpretation). Finally, even with re-
spect to (1)(b)-style precisifications, the force of the objection decreases if we 
think in terms of option (ii) rather than option (i). Here the implausibility of the 
supervaluational manoeuvre may seem striking insofar as it is unrealistic to pre-
sume that a vague language as a whole can be matched up with a precise one: a 
language L may be necessarily vague in that some of its expressions cannot be 
precisified, individually or collectively. Indeed, a precise expression E* cannot 
qualify as an admissible substitute of a vague expression E of L unless it is in 
principle possible for any two speakers of L to shift their standards of correctness 
so as to accord with the rules for the proper application of E*; it must in principle 
be possible, in other words, for any two speakers to decide to speak the language 
L* in which E* replaces E, and for it to be common knowledge that this shift has 
taken place. As there is no guarantee that every vague expression admits of re-
placements that meet these conditions,6 there is no reason to suppose that L ad-
mits of total precisifications in the sense of option (1)(b)(i). Yet this is not to say 
that we cannot learn anything about the semantics of L by considering its possible 
(1)(b)(ii)-precisifications in those cases where the above conditions are met. We 
may not want to replace vague expressions by precise ones, but the fact that we 
could—and the extent to which we could—is arguably a fact about our language 
that may contribute to explain the truth-conditions of our statements. (To put it 
differently, Fodor and LePore worry about strict identity conditions for linguistic 
expressions, but one could argue that (1)(b)-style precisifications are rather to be 
thought of as Lewisian counterparts.7 And while it may be implausible to suppose 
that all vague expressions can be matched up with admissible precise counter-
parts, it is a fact that some can.) 
On the other hand, even the formal equivalence between the various options 
might break down as soon as we consider languages that are richer than standard 
languages. Consider, for instance the result of adding an operator corresponding 
to the English phrase ‘It is definitely the case that’, abbreviated as ‘D’—a very 
natural thing to have in a vague language. If we construe precisifications along 
option (a), that is, if we think of L as being literally defined by its precisifications, 
then it is customary to treat D in analogy with the modal operator for necessity: 
assuming a relation of accessibility to be defined on the space of all given precisi-
                                                
6 John Collins and I (2000) have argued that certain rationality predicates, such as ‘ration-
ally obliged to take the money on the table in a game of take-it-or-leave-it’, are a case in point. 
7 In this sense, the worry parallels Kripke’s “Humphrey objection” to counterpart theory 
(1972, p. 45, n. 13), and the (1)(b)-supervaluationist’s reply can mimic Lewis’s (1986, p. 196). 
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fications, a statement of the form Dφ 8 will be evaluated as true on a precisifica-
tion P if and only if φ is true on all those precisifications that are accessible from 
P. Accordingly, the logic of D will depend on the conditions imposed on the ac-
cessibility relation. Since the minimum requirement is that it be reflexive, the 
minimal logic for D will correspond to the modal logic for  known as KT 
(modulo certain concerns about the entailment relation to be discussed shortly).9 
By contrast, if we construe precisifications along option (b), that is, if we think of 
L as being analytically prior to its precisifications, then there is more flexibility. 
We can still treat D in analogy to the necessity operator; but we may also treat it 
in analogy with the actuality operator, for we may want to say that the truth-value 
of Dφ on a precisification is determined by the actual truth-conditions of φ, which 
is to say by the truth-conditions of φ as initially determined by our vague semantic 
conventions. (As far as ordinary connectives and quantifiers are concerned, such 
conventions may be modelled by some partial truth-value semantics, e.g. in ac-
cordance with the weak/strong truth-conditions of Kleene 1952.) The intuition 
would be that statements of the form Dφ are not necessarily made more precise 
through making φ more precise. If φ suffers from first-order vagueness, then Dφ 
is, in a way, already perfectly precise—it is false. And if φ suffers from (n+1)-th 
order vagueness, then Dφ will only be n-th-order vague. Thus, on this view Dφ 
would be true on a precisification if and only if φ is ‘already true’ before we em-
bark in the precisification business (Dφ itself qualifying as already true if and only 
if so is φ). And the resulting logic for D would be stronger than KT: it would be at 
least as strong as the modal logic known as S5 (i.e., KT5).10  
                                                
8 To simplify notation, I shall freely treat symbols as names of themselves, using concatena-
tion to indicate the concatenation of various symbols. For example, if φ is any formula, I shall 




9 See Williamson 1994, Sect. 5.6. Strictly speaking, there are two different options here. 
One is described in the text, where the accessibility relation is somehow imposed upon a given 
space of precisifications. The other is to identify accessibility with admissibility, in the following 
sense. Every language comes with a set of precisifications, corresponding to the various ways in 
which first-order vagueness can be resolved. Each precisification, in turn, comes with a set of ad-
missible alternative precisifications, all of which may also come with sets of alternative precisifi-
cations, and so on. Super-truth is truth on all initial precisifications; definite truth at a precisifica-
tion P is truth at all precisifications admissible from the point of view of P. The two options yield 
different logics. In particular, unless admissibility is required to be transitive, on this alternative 
strategy the super-truth of a statement φ would not entail the super-truth of Dφ, while the entail-
ment holds on the approach described in the text.  
10 Again, strictly speaking there is room for other options here. For instance, Fine (1975, pp. 
141–143) equates being ‘already true’ with being true at the ‘base specification point’, which is to 
say super-true. This is still in the spirit of an actuality-like construal of D, though the outcome is 
obviously different: we still get S5, but on this account the super-truth of φ entails that of Dφ,  
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2. Validity: Global, Local, and Collective  
So much for the building blocks of supervaluationism. The basic insight is clear 
enough, but its implementation is no straightforward business and a lot depends 
on matters of detail. I now want to consider more closely what happens when we 
proceed to the task of explaining the supervaluational logic of a vague language, 
that is, not the notion of truth as applied to individual statements, but the notion of 
validity as applied to whole arguments. For the sake of generality, and not to beg 
any questions, it pays to work within the broadest possible setting, allowing for 
multiple-conclusion patterns of reasoning. Thus, by an argument I mean quite gen-
erally a set Σ of premises followed by a set Γ of conclusions, and to say that an 
argument Σ |– Γ is valid is to say that the premises in Σ jointly entail at least one 
conclusion in Γ.11 What exactly this means, and on what conditions the entailment 
obtains (hence, what logic we get), are the two questions I wish to address. 
It is important to begin with the first question. No matter how we cash out 
the idea of a precisification, it is obvious that supervaluations need not be biva-
lent: perhaps every statement can be super-true (T) or super-false (F), but some 
statements may in fact be neither—they may be indeterminate (I). It follows that 
supervaluationally we cannot identify being T with not being F, or being F with 
not being T, hence the standard notion of argument validity does not automati-
cally carry over to a supervaluational scenario. Standardly, one says that an argu-
ment is valid if and only if it is truth preserving: whenever all the premises are 
true, one of the conclusions must be true. One also says that an argument is valid 
if and only if it is not possible for all the conclusions to be false when the prem-
ises are all true. In the presence of bivalence, the two characterizations are equiva-
lent.12 Indeed, there are four equivalent ways of cashing out the same intuition: 
                                                
while the entailment may fail on the approach described in the text. Moreover, on the account in 
the text the super-truth of D(φ ∨ ψ) entails that of Dφ ∨ Dψ, while on Fine’s account it does not. 
(Fine says the latter entailment is unacceptable, which it really is if ‘definitely’ is to express, in the 
material mode, what ‘super-true’ expresses in the formal mode.) 
11 This general setting is especially important if one is interested in dualizing the analysis so 
as to apply it to what I have called ‘subvaluationism’—the view according to which a statement is 
true/false if and only if it is true/false on some admissible precisification (Varzi 1997, 1999, 2000). 
An application of subvaluational semantics to vagueness is outlined and defended in Hyde 1997.  
12 This is not to say that they express the same conception of validity. For instance, often 
one explains the rationale behind these characterizations in terms of commitments, or warranties, 
and there is no obvious equivalence between being committed to accept (or being warranted in 
asserting) a conclusion and being committed to reject (or being warranted in denying) a premise. 
As my focus here is mostly on the formal semantic features of the entailment relation, I will ig-
nore such concerns, as I will ignore any worries that might be raised on such grounds against the 
notion of a multiple-conclusion argument (referring to Restall 2005 for discussion). 
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(A) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if every premise is T, then some con-
clusion is T. 
(B) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if every conclusion is F, then some 
premise is F. 
(C) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if every premise is T, then some con-
clusion is not F. 
(D) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if every conclusion is not T, then some 
premise is F. 
In the absence of bivalence, however, there is no guarantee that the equivalence 
is preserved. In particular, on the most natural supervaluational construal, ac-
cording to which truth/falsity is super-truth/falsity, the above conditions are all 
distinct: 
(A) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if every premise is: T on all precisifica-
tions, then some conclusion is: T on all precisifications. 
(B) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if every conclusion is: F on all precisi-
fications, then some premise is: F on all precisifications. 
(C) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if every premise is: T on all precisifica-
tions, then some conclusion is not: F on all precisifications. 
(D) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if every conclusion is not: T on all pre-
cisification, then some premise is: F on all precisifications. 
(From now on, to simplify terminology I shall generally speak of precisifications 
meaning admissible precisifications.)  
To see that these four conditions are pairwise distinct, it is sufficient to con-
sider the following two argument forms: 
[1] φ, ¬φ |– φ ∧ ¬φ 
[2] φ ∨ ¬φ |– φ, ¬φ. 
Inspection shows that [1] is valid according to conditions (A) and (C), though not 
according to (B) and (D) (just let the value of φ be indeterminate). Similarly, [2] 
is valid according to conditions (B) and (C) but not according to (A) and (D). If 
we only considered single-conclusion arguments, then it’s easy to verify that A- 
and C-validity would coincide, as would B- and D-validity—but only if the lan-
guage does not contain the D operator. Otherwise we can still test the pairwise 
non-equivalence of all four conditions by considering the following: 
[3] φ |– Dφ 
[4] ¬Dφ |– ¬φ. 
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Again, inspection shows that [3] is only A- and C-valid, whereas [4] is only B- 
and C-valid, the counterexamples arising once again when φ is indeterminate. (To 
be more precise, here and below I am assuming that D is treated in accordance 
with the first policy mentioned at the end of section 1, that is, as an operator analo-
gous to the modal necessity operator.13 If D is interpreted according to the alterna-
tive policy, in analogy with the actuality operator, then [3] would be neither A-
valid nor C-valid. For example, if x is a borderline case of F, then ‘Fx ∨ ¬Fx’ 
fails to be ‘already true’ on the partial interpretation of the language, at least if we 
rely on a partial semantics à la Kleene. Hence ‘D(Fx ∨ ¬Fx)’ is not super-true 
although ‘Fx ∨ ¬Fx’ is. Likewise, [4] would be neither B- nor C-valid. We can 
already see here that the details of the basic framework can make a difference in 
the overall logic of the language.) 
So supervaluationism allows for a multiplicity of entailment relations, that 
is, notions of validity. In fact, these are not the only options, either, for a super-
valuational perspective allows for different ways of understanding the relationship 
between the premises and the conclusions of a valid argument. Conditions (A)–
(D) would be the only options if we blindly imported the standard conditions, tak-
ing T to be super-truth and F to be super-falsity 14; but a supervaluationist might 
want to exploit a different intuition. She might want to say that just as questions 
of truth may only be answered upon considering the precisifications of the lan-
guage, so questions of validity may be answered only upon considering those pre-
cisifications. Just as a statement is rated true, supervaluationally, if and only if it 
                                                
13 Modulo the qualification at note 9. 
14 To be sure, there are additional possibilities. For one thing, in the absence of bivalence it 
is natural to consider double-barrelled notions of validity (Scott 1975). Combining (A) and (B), 
for instance, one might require both transmission of (super-)truth from the premises to at least one 
conclusion and re-transmission of (super-)falsity from all conclusions to at least one premise (see 
e.g. Kremer and Kremer 2003). Since the results presented below can easily be extended to such 
notions, I will not examine them explicitly. Secondly, one might consider variants of (A)–(D) ob-
tained by contraposition. For instance, the contrapositive of (A) would read: (A') An argument is 
valid iff, necessarily, if every conclusion is not: T on all precisifications, then some premise is not: 
T on all precisifications. Ordinarily, contraposition is a logically invariant operation, so in a way 
(A') reduces to (A). However, just as there are many notions of entailment, so there are many no-
tions of equivalence (understood as two-way entailment). In particular, we shall see below that in 
a vague language with a supervaluational semantics contraposition may fail to be A-valid, which 
is to say that a statement and its contrapositive may fail to be A-equivalent. To the extent that the 
notion of an ‘admissible precisification’ is vague, the metalanguage in which the semantics is for-
mulated is itself vague, hence the (metalinguistic) A-equivalence between (A) and (A') cannot be 
proved by mere appeal to (metalinguistic) contraposition. (Thanks to Patrick Greenough for rais-
ing this point.) Nonetheless, I fail to see any counterexamples, so in the following I will ignore 
(A') and focus exclusively on (A). Ditto for the contrapositives of (B)–(D).  
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is true on all admissible precisifications, so an argument may be rated valid if and 
only if, necessarily, its premises and conclusions stand in the appropriate relation 
on all admissible precisifications. Formally, this amounts to a different way of 
fixing the scope of the relevant quantification over precisifications, corresponding 
to the following variants of (A)–(D): 
(α) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, on all precisifications: if every premise 
is T, then some conclusion is T. 
(β) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, on all precisifications: if every conclu-
sion is F, then some premise is F. 
(γ) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, on all precisifications: if every premise 
is T, then some conclusion is not F. 
(δ) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, on all precisifications: if every conclu-
sion is not T, then some premise is F. 
Tim Williamson and others have objected that these variants of (A)–(D) would 
betray a disloyalty to supervaluationism, since here super-truth plays no role in 
the definientia.15 That strikes me as unfair. For one thing, when we are dealing 
with a vague language, it seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that we may want 
to reason from premises that lack a definite truth-value, in which case super-truth 
cannot be our guidance. Indeed, one might suggest that it is precisely by reason-
ing according to (α)–(δ) that a supervaluationist finds it natural to accept so-
called principles of penumbral connection: ‘Look, I’m not sure what ‘small’ ex-
actly means, so I am not sure whether x is truly small. But I certainly know this: 
Assuming x is small, since y’s height is less than x’s, y must be small, too.’ 
Moreover, the intuitive rationale for these conditions may vary significantly ac-
cording to how we construe precisifications. If we construe them according to op-
tion (1), specifically in its (a)(i)-variant, the intuition behind (α)–(δ) seems 
straightforward precisely insofar as truth is identified with super-truth: if our lan-
guage is truly a cluster of totally precise languages, then it is natural to think that 
we should check the status of our arguments by checking their status in each lan-
guage in the cluster (and for each logically possible way of defining the cluster). 
To put it differently, to the extent that supervaluationism construes vagueness as 
ambiguity on a grand scale, as Kit Fine originally put it (1975, p. 136), type-(1) 
precisifications are like disambiguations, so to assess the validity of an argument 
amounts to checking whether the argument is valid no matter how we systemati-
cally disambiguate its premises and conclusions. By contrast, if we construe pre-
                                                
15 See Williamson 1994, p. 148. Rosanna Keefe (2000, p. 174, n. 10) agrees. 
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cisifications according to option (2), again on its (a)(i)-variant, the intuition is dif-
ferent. On this construal, the total precisifications admitted by our language are 
akin to the possible worlds countenanced in the semantics of modal logic: we in-
terpret a vague language by means of a cluster of classical models just as we in-
terpret a modal language by means of a cluster of possible worlds. So when it 
comes to argument validity, the analogy delivers exactly the account under ex-
amination: conditions (α)–(δ) match the four conditions that may be considered in 
modal logic, with ‘precisification’ in place of ‘possible world’. (This becomes 
particularly attractive if we think that vagueness is, in fact, a modal phenomenon, 
a phenomenon that induces a ‘mode of truth’ not reducible to assertoric truth, as 
Josh Dever et al. 2004, have recently argued.) Neither rationale would, I think, be 
equally appealing if we worked with precisifications of type (b) or (ii), so here 
Williamson’s misgivings may be warranted. Yet this may be debatable, too. For 
example, working with precisifications of type (2)(b), Fine opted for an A-style 
definition of argument validity (1975, p. 136), but Dummett opted for an α-style 
definition (1975, p. 108). 
Be that as it may, there is no question that (α)–(δ) suggest themselves as ob-
vious alternatives to (A)–(D). In fact, we may just focus on (α), since (β), (γ), and 
(δ) are trivially equivalent. This follows from the fact that all precisifications are 
bivalent, which means that on all precisifications being T coincides with not being 
F and being F with not being T.16 Nonetheless, inspection shows that this new 
sense of argument validity is indeed logically distinct from the four senses de-
fined in (A)–(D). As it turns out, if we confine ourselves to D-free, single-conclu-
sion patterns, an argument is bound to be α-valid if and only if it is also valid in 
the sense of conditions (A) and (C), but it may fail according to (B) and (D) (con-
sider [1]).17 If we allow for multiple-conclusion patterns, some α-valid arguments 
may also fail according to condition (A) (consider [2]). And in the presence of the 
D-operator, there are arguments that are not α-valid in spite of being C-valid 
(consider [3] and [4]). So α-validity is generally different from validity in any of 
the other four senses. Adapting Williamson’s terminology, we may say that con-
ditions (A)–(D) afford global notions of validity, whereas (α) affords a local no-
tion. In the same spirit, Stewart Shapiro (2006, Ch. 4) speaks of external and in-
ternal validity, respectively: the former, but not the latter, requires that we take 
into account the external factors that influence our way of determining the actual 
truth-conditions of our statements. 
                                                
16 Double-barrelled variants of (α)–(δ) (see note 14) will similarly collapse to (α). 
17 The proof of the equivalence between α-validity and A-validity, in D-free contexts, can 
be gathered from Shapiro 2006, Ch. 4, Theorems 13 and 15. 
13 
We may, in addition, consider the following variants, which reflect a third, 
different way of collecting the quantification over precisifications: 
(X) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if on all precisifications every premise 
is T, then on all precisifications some conclusion is T. 
(Y) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if on all precisifications every conclu-
sion is F, then on all precisifications some premise is F. 
(Z) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if on all precisifications every premise 
is T, then on all precisifications some conclusion is not F. 
(W) An argument is valid iff, necessarily, if on all precisifications every conclu-
sion is not T, then on all precisifications some premise is F. 
Here we may quickly note that (Z) is equivalent to (X), since on all precisifica-
tions being T coincides with not being F, and (W) is equivalent to (Y), since on 
all precisifications being F coincides with not being T. However, conditions (X) 
and (Y) are distinct, since only (X) validates [3] and only (Y) validates [4], and 
both conditions are distinct from any of the other conditions considered so far: 
both (X) and (Y) validate [1] (thus differing from (B) and (D)) and [2] (thus dif-
fering from (A)), but neither validates both [3] and [4] (thus differing from (C)) 
and both validate either [3] or [4] (thus differing from (α)). 
The rationale for these two additional notions of validity might appear artifi-
cial, but it isn’t. In both cases, it reflects the intuition that a valid argument is one 
in which the conjunction of the premises is related in the appropriate way to the 
disjunction of the conclusions. In classical logic, this intuition is perfectly cap-
tured by the standard definitions considered at the beginning, since that logic is 
truth-functional. But supervaluationism is not truth-functional; in particular, there 
is a difference between super-falsifying a conjunction and super-falsifying at least 
one conjunct, just as there is a difference between super-verifying a disjunction 
and super-verifying at least one disjunct. That is precisely why [1] may fail to be 
B- or D-valid, while [2] may fail to be A- or D-valid, respectively.18 This feature 
of supervaluationism may be controversial, and to some critics that is already 
enough to look elsewhere for a good semantics of vagueness. (That’s the famous 
objection from upper-case letters, as Jamie Tappenden calls it: ‘You say that “ei-
ther φ or ψ” is true, so EITHER φ OR ψ [stamp the foot, bang the table] must be 
true’, 1993, p. 564.) But never mind that; every supervaluationist must come to 
                                                
18 Likewise, super-falsifying a universal generalization differs from super-falsifying one of 
its instances, and super-verifying an existential generalization differs from super-verifying one of 
its instances. This is why, when it comes to (A)–(D), the logical status of [1] and [2] is inherited 
by arguments involving quantifiers—whence the supervaluational way out of the sorites paradox. 
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terms with this feature of their semantics—take it or leave it. What is relevant, 
from the present perspective, is that precisely because of this feature there are two 
ways of understanding the intuition behind the standard definitions of validity, 
depending on whether we understand the relevant quantifications over premises 
and conclusions collectively (‘in the same breath’) or distributively. Global and 
local notions of validity reflect a distributive reading, for they all require that each 
premise and conclusion be evaluated in its own terms. Conditions (X) and (Y), by 
contrast, reflect a collective reading: to consider whether all precisifications verify 
every premise, or falsify some premise, is to consider whether they verify or fal-
sify the relevant (possibly infinitary) conjunction, that is, whether such a conjunc-
tion is super-true or super-false, respectively; and to consider whether all precisi-
fications verify some conclusion, or falsify every conclusion, is to consider 
whether they verify or falsify the relevant (possibly infinitary) disjunction. I can 
see why such conditions may not be prima facie appealing in the absence of truth-
functionality. But they are legitimate conditions to consider, and it is a fact that 
some theories that broadly qualify as supervaluational (e.g. Rescher and Brandom 
1980, Sect. 5) are built around such a collective notion of argument-validity.  
To recapitulate, then, a supervaluational semantics makes room for at least 
seven distinct notions of argument validity: four global, one local, and two collec-
tive notions. Writing ‘Σ |= i Γ’ to indicate that the argument Σ |– Γ is i-valid, that is, 
valid according to condition (i), we can summarize the picture as follows: 
(A) Σ |= A Γ =df Necessarily, if every φ ∈ Σ is: T on all precisifications, then some 
ψ ∈ Γ is: T on all precisifications. 
(B) Σ |= B Γ =df Necessarily, if every ψ ∈ Γ is: F on all precisifications, then some 
φ ∈ Σ is: F on all precisifications. 
(C) Σ |= C Γ =df Necessarily, if every φ ∈ Σ is: T on all precisifications, then some 
ψ ∈ Γ is not: F on all precisifications. 
(D) Σ |= D Γ =df Necessarily, if every ψ ∈ Γ is not: T on all precisifications, then 
some φ ∈ Σ is: F on all precisifications. 
(α) Σ |= α Γ =df Necessarily, on all precisifications: if every φ ∈ Σ is T, then some 
ψ ∈ Γ is T. 
(X) Σ |= X Γ =df Necessarily, if on all precisifications every φ ∈ Σ is T, then on all 
precisifications some ψ ∈ Γ is T. 
(Y) Σ |= Y Γ =df Necessarily, if on all precisifications every ψ ∈ Γ is F, then on all 
precisifications some φ ∈ Σ is F. 
It would of course be nice to complete the picture with some account of the rela-
tive strengths of these entailment relations, but the account is rather intricate as 
things change significantly depending on whether Σ and Γ contain several, one, or 
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zero elements, and on whether and how the D operator is admitted into the lan-
guage. We have already seen an example of this intricacy in discussing the rela-
tionships between the local and global senses of validity. (Besides, a systematic 
comparison would call for a full formal treatment, so as to attach a precise mean-
ing to the locution ‘necessarily’ that appears in the definientia: intuitively, the lo-
cution means ‘in every logically possible situation’, but of course this may signify 
different things depending on the details of the overall semantic machinery.) The 
only general relationships that can be asserted with no qualification are that A-
validity implies C-validity and D-validity implies B-validity, whereas α-validity 
implies both X-validity and Y-validity (since the universal quantifier ‘on all pre-
cisifications’ distributes over the ‘if… then’ conditional). Moreover, all seven en-
tailment relations coincide in the two limit cases: when Σ is empty and Γ is a sin-
gleton, and when Σ is a singleton and Γ is empty. For in those cases all conditions 
amount to the same thing: the argument Σ |– Γ is valid if and only if the unique 
element of Γ is necessarily true on all precisifications, or if and only if the unique 
element of Σ is necessarily false on all precisifications, respectively. Thus, logical 
truth and logical falsity do not depend on the particular notion of validity that one 
considers. All other cases, however, require careful examination.  
3. Comparisons  
What is the best notion of validity from a supervaluational perspective? Or: is 
there a best notion? To address questions such as these, I want to take a look at 
how the options behave vis-à-vis a number of worries that have been voiced 
against the sort of logic that emerges from supervaluationism. 
One immediate consequence of the last remark of the previous section is that 
all seven notions of validity coincide with the classical notion when it comes to 
identifying logical truths and logical falsities, at least if we confine ourselves to 
supervaluational semantics based on type-(i) (i.e., total) precisifications. For, on 
the one hand, if a statement ψ is necessarily true on all such precisifications, then 
ψ is true on all precise models of the language, hence logically true in the sense of 
classical logic. On the other hand, if ψ is not necessarily true on all precisifica-
tions, then there must be a model such that ψ is false on some relevant precisifica-
tions, which implies that ψ must be false on some precise models and cannot, 
therefore, qualify as a classical logical truth. Similarly for logical falsity. This is a 
well-known result, and in one form or other it has fuelled the best-selling claim of 
supervaluationism: you can stick to classical logic even in the presence of vague-
ness. (Why can this claim not be extended to semantics based on type-(ii), partial 
precisifications? Because one motivation for such semantics is to allow for the 
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possibility that some expressions be unsharpenable, and a statement involving un-
sharpenable expressions will be indeterminate even if it is an instance of a classi-
cal logical truth/falsity. In fact, in the absence of formally ad hoc constraints, it 
may well turn out that such semantics deliver a notion of logical truth/falsity that 
is not even recursively axiomatizable.19 From now on, however, I shall for sim-
plicity ignore such semantics.) 
One thing is logical truth, though, and quite another is logical validity 
broadly understood. And it is precisely here that one begins to worry. Just how 
classical is the logic delivered by supervaluational semantics? And where it goes 
non-classical, just how adequate is it to dealing with the phenomenon of vague-
ness? Let me go through this sort of worry by briefly considering three objections 
that have attracted a great deal of attention in the recent literature. I shall phrase 
the objections in general terms, as if there were just one notion of argument valid-
ity available to supervaluationism, and then I shall try to disentangle the picture 
by examining how the objections persist or dissolve depending on which specific 
notion one considers. For the sake of precision, I shall also assume that the D op-
erator is always handled in accordance with the first policy considered earlier, 
namely, as an operator akin to the necessity operator axiomatized by a modal 
logic at least as strong as KT. This is fair enough, since this policy is compatible 
with all supervaluational accounts that we have been considering and is, in fact, a 
favorite option in the literature. Later we shall see whether treating D as an actual-
ity operator can make a difference. 
Objection 1. Supervaluationism may well deliver a classical notion of logical 
truth, or even a classical notion of entailment relative to single-conclusion argu-
ments. But as soon as we look at the large picture, we find multi-conclusion ar-
gument forms that are classically valid and yet may fail in a vague supervalua-
tionary language. Argument [2] above is a case in point. Even disregarding the 
objection from upper-case letters, there are many other instances of the same phe-
nomenon—for example: 
[5] φ |– ψ, ¬(φ → ψ) 
[6] ∀xFx |– ∀xGx, ¬∀x(Fx → Gx). 
[Proof:20 For [5], let φ be T and ψ be I. For [6], suppose everything in the domain 
is F, whereas some things are G and the rest is borderline G.] 
                                                
19 A negative result of this sort is known to hold for supervaluationary treatments of non-
denoting singular terms; see Bencivenga 1978. 
20 I write ‘proof’ meaning ‘purported proof’. As will be obvious shortly, the proof only goes 
through on some understandings of ‘valid argument’. 
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Objection 2. Even with respect to single-conclusion arguments, the claim 
that supervaluationism preserves classical logic is only true on a narrow concep-
tion of ‘logic’. For example, as Williamson (1994, pp. 151f) pointed out, the fol-
lowing rules of inference are classically valid, yet they may fail in a vague lan-
guage with a supervaluational semantics:21 
[7] From Σ, φ |= ψ infer Σ |= φ → ψ  Conditional proof 
[8] From Σ, φ |= ψ infer Σ, ¬ψ |= ¬φ Contraposition 
[9] From Σ, φ |= ψ ∧ ¬ψ infer Σ |= ¬φ  Indirect proof 
[10] From Σ, φ |= σ and Σ, ψ |= σ infer Σ, φ ∨ ψ |= σ  Proof by cases 
[Proof: For [7] and [8], let ‘ψ’ be ‘Dφ’; for [9], let ‘φ’ be ‘σ ∧ ¬Dσ’ and ‘ψ’ be 
‘Dσ’; for [10], let ‘ψ’ be ‘¬φ’, and ‘σ’ be ‘Dφ ∨ D¬φ’.] 
Objection 3. The supervaluational account of the D operator is inconsistent 
with unrestricted higher-order vagueness. For, on the one hand, if unrestricted 
higher-order vagueness is admitted, then the relation of accessibility among pre-
cisifications must be such as to verify the following entailment whenever xj and 
xj+1 are adjacent elements of a sorites series: 
[11] DDnFxj |= ¬D¬DnFxj+1 D-gap 
(‘Dn’ stands for n repetitions of ‘D’, n ≥ 0). On the other hand, super-truth entails 
definite truth: 
[12] φ |= Dφ. D-introduction 
Yet [11] and [12] are logically inconsistent. As Crispin Wright (1987, p. 233) and 
Delia Graff (2003, p. 201) have shown,22 given a sorites series of n objects x1 … 
xn such that ‘Fx1’ is super-true and ‘Fxn’ is super-false, those principles jointly 
imply the contradiction: 
[13] DnFx1 ∧ ¬DnFx1. 
[Proof: The first conjunct follows from Fx1 by n applications of [12]; the second 
follows from ¬Fxn by repeated applications of [12] and [11].] 
Now, there are several things that supervaluationists have said (or could say) 
in response to these objections, but that is not my main concern here. For the re-
                                                
21 The failure of [8] and [9] is already noted in Fine 1975 and Machina 1976, respectively.  
22 The proof mentioned here is Graff’s, and differs from Wright’s in a significant way to 
which I shall briefly return below. Strictly speaking, Graff does not rely on [12] but on the rule: 
From Σ |= φ infer Σ |= Dφ, from which [12] follows (since φ |= φ). 
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cord, I don’t think faithfulness to classical logic is such a big deal. It’s not that 
supervaluationism has been put forward as a semantics for vagueness that retains 
classical logic holus bolus. It has been put forward as a semantics for vagueness 
in its own right, one that reflects a certain understanding of what vagueness is and 
of how the truth conditions of statements involving vague words can be specified 
without abandoning the terra firma of our standard semantic algorithms. As Fine 
put it, there is but one rule linking super-truth to classical truth, so the truth condi-
tions are, if not classical, ‘classical at a remove’ (1975, p. 132). If it turns out that 
supervaluational semantics yields classical logic—good; for classical logic is a 
nice thing in spite of the fact that it has been developed on the Fregean assump-
tion that precision is a sine qua non condition (see Frege 1903, §56). If it turns out 
that the logic is not fully classical—so be it; after all, classical logic has been de-
veloped under the Fregean assumption. In short, I agree with Stewart Shapiro 
(2006, Sect. 4.5): We should first determine how vague expressions function, and 
figure out the logic from there.  
Anyway, this is not my main concern here. My main concern is whether and 
to what extent the classicality issue depends on the notion of validity one consid-
ers. For although there is but one rule linking super-truth to classical truth, at least 
relative to any particular way of spelling out the details of the machinery, there 
are several notions of validity that suggest themselves, all of which have equal 
claim to being a natural extension of our classical understanding of this notion. 
Perhaps here is where supervaluationism makes room for battles of intuitions. Or 
perhaps this is just a sign of the fact that once bivalence is abandoned, validity 
ceases to be an all-or-nothing affair. In any event, it is obvious that the charge of 
non-classicality warrants further investigation in the light of the multiplicity of 
meanings that we can attach to the notion of a valid argument. Moreover, some of 
the above-mentioned objections do not concern the classicality of supervalua-
tional logic but rather its independent adequacy vis-à-vis the phenomenon of 
vagueness. Supervaluationists have dealt extensively with some basic misgivings 
in this regard, such as the objection from upper-case letters and its relevance to 
the sorites paradox.23 They have also explained how their semantics can make 
room for higher-order vagueness: just as our beliefs and linguistic practices do not 
succeed in fixing a unique language, or a unique interpretation of the language, 
they may not succeed in fixing a unique cluster of languages, or a unique cluster 
of interpretations, which means that the notion of an admissible precisification 
may itself be vague. This is enough to say that the framework allows for the pos-
                                                
23 See, for instance, McGee and McLaughlin 1995, pp. 207ff, and Keefe 2000a, Sect. 7.5. 
My own views on this objection may be found in Varzi 2003a, Sect. 2, and 2004, Sect. 4. 
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sibility that a statement be indeterminately indeterminate, or indeterminately inde-
terminately indeterminate, and so on.24 However, objection 3 says that higher-
order vagueness leads to serious problems independently of this general sort of 
consideration, at least insofar as it can be represented in the object language by 
means of the D operator, so the worry cannot be dismissed so easily. In fact, it is 
clear that the issue of higher-order vagueness ties in directly with the question of 
what is the logic delivered by a supervaluational semantics. For otherwise we 
could just rely on the vagueness of our metalanguage (which affects our pre-
analytic notion of truth just as it affects the notion of an admissible precisifica-
tion) and let vagueness be taken care of by the Tarski biconditional: 
[14] ‘φ’ is true if and only if φ. 
The vagueness of the object language would be reflected in the vagueness of the 
truth-predicate, and that would be it. This is what Rosanna Keefe calls the ‘Sim-
ple Theory’ of vagueness (2000a, pp. 205f). And the reason why this theory won’t 
do is precisely that we are left with the task of explaining the logic of the ‘if and 
only if’ connective in the metalanguage. If its logic were fully classical, then we 
could run Williamson’s argument (1994, pp. 187–189) and conclude that the ex-
cluded middle entails bivalence: 
[15] ‘φ ∨ ¬φ’ is true if and only if ‘φ’ is true or ‘¬φ’ is true. 
Thus, to the extent that vagueness involves semantic indeterminacy, either the ob-
ject language or the metalanguage must fail to obey to classical logic. Let me 
therefore go through each objection in turn. 
Consider Objection 1, to the effect that multi-conclusion arguments may not 
retain their logical status in supervaluational logic. We have already seen that al-
though [1] is not valid according to conditions (B) and (D), it is valid according to 
(A) and (C). Likewise, we have seen that [2] is invalid according to conditions 
(A) and (D) but valid according to (B) and (C)—and inspection shows that the 
same holds of [5] and [6]. Moreover, inspection shows that all such arguments are 
valid according to condition (α), hence according to (X) and (Y). Thus, there are 
four notions of super-validity according to which these arguments are valid—
global C-validity, local α-validity, and collective X- and Y-validity—and it is 
easy to verify that this applies to every argument that is rated valid in classical 
logic. So obviously the charge depends crucially on what ‘valid’ means in a su-
pervaluationary context.  
                                                
24 This popular line of reaction is fully spelled out in Keefe 2000a, Sect. 8.1.  
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With Objection 2 the picture is more intricate. On the one hand, one can 
again check that all rules of inference retain their classical status if ‘|=’ is given a 
local reading,25 while they may fail on the global reading corresponding to con-
dition (A): the rules do not preserve super-truth. On the other hand, this time the 
global readings corresponding to conditions (B) and (D) are unaffected by the 
objection, since both verify all the rules, while the global reading corresponding 
to condition (C) is affected by the objection, since it verifies [7]–[9] but not [10]. 
Furthermore, although the rules are verified by one of the collective readings, 
corresponding to condition (Y), each of [7]–[10] may fail on the other reading, 
corresponding to condition (X). In short, the picture is this: conditional proof, 
contraposition, and indirect proof fail to be i-valid if and only if i = A, X; proof by 
cases fails if and only if i = A, C, X. This means that there are again four notions 
of supervaluationary validity that behave classically—global B- and D-validity, 
local α-validity, collective Y-validity—though these notions do not quite coincide 
with the ones that resist Objection 1. Putting the two objections together, one 
could therefore conclude that there are still two senses of validity on which super-
valuationists can claim full faithfulness to classical logic: local α-validity and col-
lective Y-validity. Yet this may begin to sound as though the number of options is 
getting slim and unattractive: no notion of global validity can do the job. 
Se let us finally consider Objection 3, to the effect that supervaluationary ac-
counts of the D operator do not allow for unrestricted higher-order vagueness due 
to the inconsistency of [11] (D-gap) and [12] (D-introduction). The proof I have 
offered of this claim is due to Delia Graff, and is significantly stronger than 
Crispin Wright’s original proof (which makes use of D-introduction within sub-
proofs26). Nonetheless, it should now be obvious that the proof goes through only 
on some construals. For one thing, although D-gap may be accepted across the 
board,27 we have already seen that D-introduction is not i-valid for i = B, D, α, Y, 
so on those readings of ‘|=’ the objection does not get off the ground. Second, the 
proof depends on repeated applications of both D-gap and D-introduction, so it 
relies on the following classical rule of inference: 
[16] From Σ, φ |= ψ and Σ, ψ |= σ infer Σ, φ |= σ. Transitivity 
As it turns out, this rule is generally valid, but it fails on the C-reading of ‘|=’ (let 
‘φ’ be ‘¬Dγ’, ‘ψ’ be ‘¬γ’, and ‘σ’ be ‘D¬γ’, and suppose γ is indeterminate). 
                                                
25 This is emphasized in McGee and McLaughlin 1998, though in a slightly different jargon. 
26 Edgington (1993) and Heck (1993) have argued that this is illegitimate. 
27 This is not to say that D-gap is i-valid for all i; only that it can be i-valid as a result of im-
posing suitable conditions on the accessibility relation. 
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Thus, the proof does not go through on this reading, either. We are therefore left 
with only two readings to which the objection applies, namely when ‘|=’ stands 
for A-validity or for X-validity. In other words, all the proof establishes is the fol-
lowing claim, for i = A, X:28 
[17] Fx1, ¬Fxn |=i DnFx1 ∧ ¬DnFx1. 
Of course, since neither value of i verifies the rule of indirect proof [9], this result 
is not enough to reach either of the following conclusions, each of which would 
amount to a sorites paradox: 
[18] Fx1 |=i Fxn 
[19] ¬Fxn |=i ¬Fx1, 
However, this is of little consolation since [17] does imply that ‘Fx1’ and ‘¬Fxn’ 
cannot be both super-true, contrary to the facts, and that is enough to conclude 
that A-validity and X-validity are inconsistent with higher-order vagueness.  
In conclusion, the moral we can draw from the three objections is that A-
validity fares badly on all scores whereas α-validity and Y-validity fair perfectly 
well. The other notions are somewhere in between: 
 |= A |= B |= C |= D |= α |= X |= Y 
Objection 1        
Objection 2        
Objection 3        
4. A-Validity to the Rescue? 
The bad thing about this moral is that A-validity is, after all, a most natural way 
of extending the standard notion of argument validity to a supervaluationary 
framework. Never mind the fact that the framework admits of other ways. There 
surely is an important sense in which we want to say that a good argument is one 
that never lets you go from true premises to false conclusions, and if truth is su-
per-truth this means that the global notion of validity captured by condition (A) is 
an important one, if not the only one. Indeed, supervaluationists might easily con-
cede Objection 1, on the grounds of the fact that multiple-conclusion arguments 
                                                
28 Indeed, the proof only establishes this fact on the assumption that D works as a necessity 
operator. We have already pointed out that when D is treated in analogy to the actuality operator, 
D-introduction may fail also on these readings of ‘|=’. It may also fail if D is treated along the 
lines mentioned in note 9. I’ll briefly come back to this point below. 
22 
are not paradigmatic, or because such arguments justify a collective understand-
ing of what validity amounts to. But succumbing to the other objections is cer-
tainly something to worry about, since it would mean that A-validity yields a 
logic that is both far from classical and far from acceptable in the presence of 
higher-order vagueness. 
Let us focus again on Objection 2 and the worry about classicality. There 
are two additional remarks that are worth making. First of all, one could observe 
that the presence of the D operator in the relevant counterexamples is crucial. In 
fact, all possible counterexamples to the inference rules [7]–[10] appear to be 
restricted to arguments involving the D operator, or similar devices (such as the 
truth predicate or vagueifiers such as ‘roughly’ or ‘-ish’) whose semantics re-
quires truth on a precisification to call upon truth-values across a whole family 
of precisifications.29 This is important, at least relative to D. For it means that 
whether or not [7]–[10] turn out to be valid depends crucially on the interpretation 
of D. Indeed, we have been assuming that D be interpreted as a necessity-like 
operator. But if we switch to the alternative interpretation mentioned earlier, that 
is, if we interpret D in analogy with the actuality operator, then [7]–[10] do pre-
serve their classical status. For example, we have seen that on that interpreta-
tion D-introduction [12] fails, so [7] and [8] would both be safe. The counterex-
ample to [9] would be blocked for similar reasons. Finally, [10] would be safe be-
cause the argument φ |– Dφ ∨ D¬φ turns out not to be A-valid, since φ can be su-
per-true even if it fails to be ‘already true’ on the partial interpretation of the lan-
guage (e.g. when φ is ‘Fx ∨ ¬Fx’ and x is a borderline case of F, again assuming 
a partial semantics à la Kleene). So isn’t this enough to save A-validity from Ob-
jection 2? Isn’t it enough to switch from the necessity-like reading of D to its ac-
tuality-like reading?30 
                                                
29 This point has been advertised in Fine 1975, p. 290, and Keefe 2000a, p. 178, though the 
only proof I am aware of (with regard to [7]) is in Graff 2003, p. 211. Conversely, one could con-
tend that [7]–[10] may fail in classical logic, too, provided ‘φ’, ‘ψ’, etc. are allowed to range over 
open formulas. For instance, Williams 2005 points out that classically we have Fx |= ∀xFx but not 
¬∀xFx |= ¬Fx. This may be right, but not enough to counter the objection. For it suffices to say 
that when restricted to statements, that is, closed formulas, [7]–[10] are classically but not super-
valuationally valid. In any event, even the classical validity of Fx |= ∀xFx is controversial. If 
‘φ |= ψ’ is read as ‘if all assignments of values to variables satisfy φ, then all assignments of val-
ues to variables satisfy ψ’, then the entailment holds. But not all textbooks follow this reading 
(which calls for a restriction of the Deduction Theorem). On the contrary, many classics read 
‘φ |= ψ’ as ‘any assignment of values to variables that satisfies φ also satisfies ψ’ (see e.g. Men-
delson 1987, p. 52; Enderton 2001, p. 88). On that reading, the entailment Fx |= ∀xFx fails. 
30 Equivalently, isn’t it enough to switch to the alternative semantics mentioned in note 9 
(which blocks D-introduction)? See Williams 2005 for a proposal in this sense. 
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It isn’t. Never mind the question of whether the actuality-like reading is a 
better candidate for modeling the English phrase ‘It is definitely the case that’. 
Even if we switched to that reading, nothing would prevent us from introducing a 
different operator, D, whose semantics is exactly the one we have so far been 
assuming for D, that is, the semantics akin to the necessity-like reading.31 Evi-
dently, such an operator would satisfy the analogue of D-introduction and coun-
terexamples to [7]–[10] could therefore be constructed with ‘D’ in place of ‘D’, 
so Objection 2 would strike back. There just is no way to evade the objection 
simply by wangling with the semantics of this or that operator, for there is no way 
of banning all trouble-makers once and for all. 
The second remark is this. Since D and similar devices play a crucial role in 
the counterexamples to [7]–[10], one might conclude that the lesson to be learned 
from Objection 2 is simply that A-validity requires extra caution in the pres-
ence of such special operators—hardly a surprising lesson given their characteris-
tically metalinguistic flavor. Unfortunately, however, we cannot leave it at that. 
Surely, if extra caution is needed, we should better come up with suitably revised 
rules of inference that do work for us in the problematic cases as well. Can that 
be done?  
Rosanna Keefe (2000a, pp. 179f) has offered the following positive answer: 
if the language contains the D operator, for instance (and let us stick to its neces-
sity-like interpretation for simplicity), all we have to do is replace [7]–[10] with 
the following: 
[7*] From Σ, φ |= ψ infer Σ |= Dφ → ψ   
[8*] From Σ, φ |= ψ infer Σ, ¬ψ |= ¬Dφ  
[9*] From Σ, φ |= ψ ∧ ¬ψ infer Σ |= ¬Dφ   
[10*] From Σ, φ |= σ and Σ, ψ |= σ infer Σ, Dφ ∨ Dψ |= σ. 
These rules are indeed valid across the board, that is, on all seven readings of ‘|=’, 
while reducing to [7]–[10] in the presence of bivalence, so in a way we have what 
we want. On the other hand, at this point we may still ask (and I think we ought to 
ask): What is the status of such ‘rules’?  
                                                
31 Well, perhaps this is a bit hasty. The referee pointed out that the combination of ‘D’ and 
‘D’ may raise odd cases. For example, one could create analogues of what Zalta (1988) called 
‘logical truths that are not necessary’. With the alethic actuality operator ‘A’, when φ is only con-
tingently true one gets that φ ↔ Aφ is logically true (for it is true no matter how the actual world 
is) but not necessarily true (for it is false at any possible world at which φ is false). Dual to this are 
logical falsehoods that are not necessarily false, like ¬φ ↔ Aφ (see Sobel 2004, p. 556, n. 13). It is 
not clear to me, however, whether such oddities, and especially their analogues for the ‘definitely’ 
operators, are a reason to prevent the combination. 
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If we think of them literally as rules of inference, then we are not done at all; 
we still have to show that the revised rules are enough to preserve semantic com-
pleteness, and as Brian Weatherson (2002, p. 34) has pointed out, this is far from 
obvious. For example, the following argument forms are supervaluationally valid 
in every sense of the term, yet they cannot be proved if [7]–[10] are replaced by 
[7*]–[10*]: 
[20] |– p → p   
[21] p |– ¬¬p  
[22] p ∨ q |– q ∨ p   
[23] p → q |– (p ∧ r) → q.  
Perhaps this problem could be taken care of by relying on both sets of rules under 
suitable restrictions: use [7]–[10] for D-free arguments, otherwise use [7*]–[10*]. 
I am not sure this would work, but even if it did, things would again begin to look 
ugly and one might as well think that the right thing to do is to bite the bullet and 
give up A-validity altogether.  
On the other hand, perhaps we should not think of the rules as rules of infer-
ence in the strict sense. It is customary to phrase them using the locution ‘From 
… infer’, but really the locution ‘If … then’ would be just as fine: rules are just 
metalinguistic conditionals whose application involves a metalinguistic modus 
ponens. (This is why logicians worry about what the Tortoise said to Achilles.32) 
If so, then the problem appears to dissolve. Or rather, the initial objection turns 
into something else than what it was meant to be and Keefe’s cure seems per-
fectly all right. For it’s not that supervaluationism preserves classical logic only 
on a narrow conception of ‘logic’, where inferences count and rules of inference 
don’t. More simply, supervaluationism preserves classical logic (with respect to 
single-conclusion arguments) only insofar as we consider the object language. 
That some statements in the metalanguage fail to be preserved is no news: we al-
ready know that the bivalence principle, for instance, breaks down.  
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning does not suffice to justify the cure. For 
whether or not we think of [7*]–[10*] as rules of inference, if such statements are 
true, then their truth will contribute to determining the logic of the object lan-
guage. And if there is a sense in which this determination is too weak, as men-
tioned above, there is also a sense in which it is too strong. For example, inspec-
tion shows that the analogue of the S4 modal principle for the D operator turns 
out to be A-valid: 
                                                
32 I am thinking of the ‘justification of deduction’ problem raised in Carroll 1895 and 
brought to current attention in Dummett 1973 and Haack 1976. 
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[24] Dφ → DDφ. 
(This follows from [7*] by taking ‘ψ’ to be ‘DDφ’, given the A-validity of D-
introduction and transitivity.) And in the presence of second-order vagueness, the 
validity of [24] is just as problematic as the first-order validity of  
[25] φ → Dφ, 
which is exactly what [7*] was designed to avoid. In other words, accepting 
Keefe’s cure is tantamount to ruling out higher-order vagueness, at least insofar as 
this can be expressed using the D operator on its necessity-like reading. 
This brings us to Objection 3, which effectively shows that A-validity is in-
compatible with higher-order vagueness regardless of this maneuver to save it 
from Objection 2. For Objection 3 does not depend on any of the critical princi-
ples in [7]–[10]. It only depends on D-introduction, D-gap, and transitivity, all of 
which are intrinsically plausible.33 Is there any way of deflating this result without 
giving up A-validity altogether? It seems to me that there are only two options: 
denying that the D operator can fully represent the concept of determinacy in the 
object language, or making sense of the idea that all vagueness is indeed first-
order. (A third option would be to reject D-introduction by switching to the ac-
tuality reading of D. However, such a reading yields an S5 logic, so [24] would 
still hold.34) 
The first option can be spelled out as follows. Williamson (1994, p. 160) 
pointed out that there is a problem with the D operator in that hidden sharp 
boundaries are bound to pop up even if we allowed for non-trivial infinite itera-
tions of D. For let us suppose we introduce a new operator to express determinacy 
at every level of the hierarchy: 
[26] D*φ =df Dφ ∧ DDφ ∧ DDDφ ∧ … 
This new operator is automatically transitive, hence it satisfies the analogue of the 
S4 axiom [24]: 
[27] D*φ → D*D*φ. 
                                                
33 Actually, in the presence of D-introduction and transitivity, D-gap amounts to the princi-
ple Fxj |= ¬D¬DnFxj+1, and it is unclear whether this principle really expresses a non-negotiable 
intuition about higher-order vagueness. (Thanks to Richard Heck Jr for pointing this out.) None-
theless, to reject D-gap on such grounds strikes me as exceedingly dismissive of the objection.  
34 Again, strictly speaking there is still a further option, corresponding to the alternative se-
mantics for D outlined in note 9. On that semantics D-introduction fails, too, and so does [24]. 
However, this option eventually leads to the same issue discussed in the text with reference to the 
D* operator, so I shall not consider it.  
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Does this mean that D*φ cannot be indeterminate? Well, not necessarily: one 
could say that the vagueness of D* is just not something that can be expressed us-
ing that very operator itself. As Williamson puts it, one could say that the D* op-
erator cannot be used to measure its own vagueness: that would be ‘like a cloud 
said to have an exact length because it is exactly as long as itself’ (1994, p. 160). 
To do the job properly, we would need to resort to a new operator, D**, defined in 
a similar fashion, and the vagueness of D* would manifest itself not in the failure 
of [27] but rather in the failure of  
[28] D*φ → D**D*φ. 
Now—one could argue—if this line of reasoning is accepted, then why not apply 
it to the D operator itself? This operator satisfies the S4 axiom [24], but that need 
not amount to saying that D cannot be vague; it’s just that the vagueness of D 
cannot be expressed using that very operator itself. To do the job properly we 
would need to resort to a new operator D′, an operator capturing the first-order 
vagueness of the metalanguage, and point out that the truth of [24] does not imply 
the truth of  
[29] Dφ → D′Dφ. 
And so on and so forth. Informally, this is just a different way of saying that we 
need to ascend to the metalanguage to capture the vagueness of our talk of ‘ad-
missible precisifications’, hence of super-truth. Supervaluationists who sympa-
thize with the latter idea have no difficulty in accepting this line of response, thus 
saving A-validity from the charge of inadequacy vis-à-vis the phenomenon of 
higher-order vagueness (see Keefe 2000a, p. 210). In particular, the D-gap princi-
ple [11] on which Objection 3 relies would be rejected for similar reasons. If xj 
and xj+1 are two adjacent members of a sorites series for a predicate F, then there 
are two possibilities: either F does not suffer from higher-order vagueness, or it 
does. If it doesn’t, then the objection misfires. If it does, then D-gap is not unre-
strictedly A-valid. It is only first-order A-valid, so to say—that is, valid for n = 0. 
In other words, we can accept [30] but not [31], thus blocking the objection at the 
second step of the proof: 
[30] DFxj |=A ¬D¬Fxj+1 
[31] DDFxj |=A ¬D¬DFxj+1. 
I think this way of handling the problem is technically correct and perfectly 
defensible on formal grounds. Indeed, we have already said that supervalua-
tionism must come to terms with the fact that it may be vague which precisifica-
tions should count as admissible, and this is just the same idea spelled out in re-
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gard to the logic of D.35 I myself have sympathized with this view for a long time. 
However, I am no longer convinced it is fully acceptable. One problem is simply 
that a hierarchy of definiteness operators faces the same sort of objections that 
have been raised against Tarskian theories of truth. Keefe says that the multiplic-
ity of operators is still compatible with a univocal account of the meaning of 
‘definitely’ insofar as ‘its formalization within a sentence can depend systemati-
cally on its position in the embedding’ (2000a, p. 210). That may be right, and it 
might even be right with regard to the truth predicate.36 On the face of it, how-
ever, it appears that we can use ‘true’ and ‘definitely’ to pick out concepts outside 
the hierarchy, as when we say that everything John believes is true, or when we 
object to ontological vagueness by claiming that everything in the world is 
determinately one way or the other. In this sense, the analogy between D and D* 
does not seem to be fair.  
Another problem is that there is something fishy in a hierarchy that works 
that way. Supervaluationism accounts for first-order vagueness by representing 
the object language via its precisifications. But if higher-order vagueness can only 
be accounted for by representing our metalanguage(s) in a similar fashion, then it 
means that the higher-order vagueness of an object-language predicate such as 
‘small’ is really the first-order vagueness of ‘definitely’ (or ‘true’). Now, there 
certainly is a correlation between the former and the latter. But as already Fine 
(1975, p. 148) pointed out, it would seem that the latter arises from the former, 
not vice versa. ‘Definitely’ and ‘true’ supervene upon the object language: there 
can be no independent grounds for their having borderline cases. Another way 
of phrasing this worry is that on this approach first-order vagueness is unwarrant-
ably sui generis. As Brian Weatherson (2002, p. 47) pointed out, the approach 
accounts for first-order vagueness in terms of multiplicity of precisifications, 
and second- and higher-order vagueness in terms of indeterminacy of the multi-
plicity, indeterminacy of this indeterminacy, and so on. Why the bifurcation?—
Weatherson asks. If at every higher level vagueness amounts to there being inde-
terminacy as to what the relevant precisifications are, why not represent the object 
language itself through one precisification and regard all vagueness as coming 
about from there being indeterminacy as to what that precisification looks like? 
                                                
35 Patrick Greenough (2005, pp. 185f) raises the following worry. For each n ≥ 1, let Dn be 
the operator capturing the n-th order vagueness of the language (so, in particular, D1 = D and D2 = 
D′). Then, in a finite sorites for F, there is bound to be some n such that, for every x, either 
Dn+1Dn…D1Fx or Dn+1¬Dn…D1Fx, which is to say that the series is bound to involve a sharp cut-
off at the n+1-th level. However, this strikes me as all right, unless higher-order vagueness is iden-
tified with what Sainsbury (1990) calls ‘boundarylessness’ (as urged e.g. in Horgan 1998). 
36 But see McGee 1991. 
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The answer, of course, is that going this way would take us back to the Simple 
Theory of vagueness reflected in the acceptance of the Tarski biconditional [14]: 
in Fine’s words, the vagueness of truth would wax and wane with the vagueness 
of the statement to be evaluated (1975, p. 149). We saw that the reason why this 
theory won’t suffice is that it leaves us with the task of explaining the logic of the 
metalanguage—the ‘if and only if’ in Tarski’s biconditional. But that is precisely 
what this approach says we should do; we should attend to the vagueness of the 
metalanguage. So either we don’t do that or, if we do it, then we should stop wor-
rying about A-validity in the first place. Global validity has no room in the Simple 
Theory of vagueness, for super-truth vanishes: on the Simple Theory, the multi-
plicity of admissible precisifications is only relevant to the semantics of ‘defi-
nitely’ and the only supervaluationary notion of validity is local (our α-validity). 
All of this speaks against the first option mentioned above—denying that D 
can fully represent definiteness in the object language. What about the second op-
tion? Can one save A-validity by making sense of the idea that all vagueness is in 
fact first-order? To most people, this would just be biting the bullet. Of course 
there is higher-order vagueness, for just as our linguistic practices and beliefs 
have failed to draw a precise boundary between the small and the non-small, they 
have failed to draw a precise boundary between the small and smallish, or be-
tween the smallish and the smallish-ish. The trouble with vagueness is that vague 
predicates—and vague expressions at large—draw no boundaries at all, not that 
they merely fail to draw the boundaries presupposed by the Fregean ideal of pre-
cision. I agree. Nonetheless it is legitimate to ask: Why so? What is the argument 
to the effect that accepting vagueness entails accepting higher-order vagueness? 
One argument to this effect—in fact, the only argument I am aware of—
comes from Dominic Hyde (1994). According to Hyde, the existence of higher 
orders of vagueness follows from the twofold consideration that (i) there are 
vague predicates and (ii) ‘vague’ is one of them. Now, there is no question about 
(i), so the argument depends entirely on (ii). And what reasons do we have to ac-
cept (ii)? Hyde appeals to a proof by Roy Sorensen (1985), to the effect that 
‘vague’ is prone to the sorites paradox. However, as I pointed out elsewhere 
(Varzi 2003b), Sorensen’s proof depends on the assumption that some predicates 
(specifically the predicate ‘small’) are higher-order vague, so one cannot rely on 
that proof in order to establish the existence of such predicates. For the record, 
elsewhere (Varzi 2005) I have also defended Sorensen’s proof against a number 
of formal misgivings that have been raised even recently, so I do accept (ii), 
hence I do find Hyde’s argument sound. Nonetheless the argument is circular and 
cannot be used to establish the point under examination, namely the existence of 
higher-order vagueness. So unless one can do better, the option of denying 
29 
higher-order vagueness is in principle available, and the friend of supervaluational 
A-validity might just resort to it.  
As I said, to most of us this sounds like biting the bullet. But let me spend a 
word on behalf of this option, since at this point so much depends on it. Let us 
focus on a vague predicate F. The intuition is that it is hard to accept the existence 
of a sharp boundary between the borderline cases of F and its clear positive in-
stances (or its clear negative instances). Why so? The informal answer is that in a 
sorites series for F, the last positive instance and the first borderline case are just 
as indiscernible (in the relevant respects) as any other adjacent cases. However, 
this is not to say that there is no such boundary; it’s just that it is impossible to 
draw it. More precisely, one could argue that it is impossible to draw a sharp line 
demarcating those items that are relevantly indiscernible from the end members of 
the series from those items that are not so indiscernible, and that the source of this 
impossibility is epistemic. Such reasons, as Robert Koons (1994) pointed out (and 
Williamson, 1990, Sect. 6.3, before him), would lie in the fact that the property of 
being indiscernible with respect to every property that is relevant for the applica-
tion of the predicate F is not decidable. More precisely, is only semi-decidable. If 
a and b are discernible, then we can eventually find out—either by direct com-
parison, or by finding a third element c so that a is discernible from c while b 
isn’t. But we may not be able to tell if two given objects a and b are indiscernible, 
for the task of going through all possible relevant comparisons with other objects 
is a never-ending task. To illustrate, suppose aj is any member of the series that is 
discernible—with respect to F—from the initial member, a0. We can explain this 
fact by directly comparing aj to a0 or, if they look relevantly similar, by noting 
that aj, but not a0, is indiscernible from some later item aj+k. However, we may not 
be able to tell whether aj is the first such object, for we may not be able to verify 
whether its predecessor is indiscernible from a0. In short, the idea is that a seman-
tic account of the vagueness of F can be combined with an epistemicist account 
for the vagueness of indiscernibility (i.e. the predicate ‘indiscernible’ or the un-
derlying concept). And this would suffice to justify the claim that all vagueness is 
indeed first-order. 
Of course, one may respond that if we are willing to appeal to epistemicism 
when it comes to indiscernibility, we might as well buy into wholesale epistemi-
cism with regard to vagueness: what’s the point of splitting the account? But there 
is an answer: ‘indiscernible’ is a relational predicate, and there are good reasons 
to think that in many cases relational predicates are not semantically vague even if 
they yield prima facie semantic indeterminacy. The identity predicate is arguably 
a case in point. Surely ‘identical’ is not semantically vague, yet one could argue 
that it is epistemically vague: if x’s sharing the same properties as y is a necessary 
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condition to determine whether x = y, the truth of this identity statement may be 
epistemically indeterminate owing to the impossibility of surveying all the prop-
erties. Such is the drawback of Leibniz’s law—the indiscernibility of identicals—
when it comes to its application to concrete identity issues. No serious super-
valuationist would claim that the prima facie indeterminacy of the mind-body 
problem is a sign of semantic vagueness, at least not without buying into a whole 
metaphysical package that calls for independent justification.  
Be that as it may, let me emphasize that I am not defending this account. I’m 
just outlining it on behalf of the view that all vagueness is first-order, which is 
what the friend of A-validity is forced to hold. That it is a good account is a dif-
ferent story. In fact, my overall assessment is that going this way simply shifts the 
burden of proof: the argument in favour of higher-order vagueness calls for non-
question-begging evidence for the claim that ‘vague’ is semantically vague, like 
‘small’; the argument against higher-order vagueness calls for non-question-
begging evidence for the claim that ‘indiscernible’ is epistemically vague, like 
‘identical’. Strictly speaking we are at a deadlock. But in all honesty, it is awk-
ward that in order to rescue the notion of A-validity and the primacy of super-
truth, a supervaluationist should find herself in the business of arguing for an 
epistemic way out.  
5. α-Validity for Everybody 
With all this, I think supervaluationists should better take seriously the idea that 
when it comes to the logic of a vague language, global validity—and A-validity in 
particular—is not as good a notion as one might initially think. And since we have 
seen that the only two notions of validity that do not suffer from the objections are 
the local notion of α-validity and the collective notion of Y-validity, supervalua-
tionists should take seriously the idea that these notions are not as bad as one 
might have thought. In fact, since Y-validity does not correspond to the intuition 
that validity is preservation of truth (but only the weaker intuition that validity is 
preservation of non-falsity), supervaluationists should take seriously the idea of 
‘going local’.37 As I have mentioned, this idea is particularly attractive if we back 
                                                
37 I have focused on the notion of validity, but of course going local will have an impact on 
other notions, too. For instance, standardly an argument is sound if and only if it is valid and its 
premises are true. We may stick to this definition on the understanding that truth is super-truth. 
However, if validity is construed locally, a sound argument need not have a true conclusion, oth-
erwise the sorites paradox would strike back. (This can be verified by considering the paradox in 
the form: Fx1 |– ¬(Fx1 → Fx2), … , ¬(Fxn–1 → Fxn), Fxn, where x1 … xn form a sorites series with 
respect to F; this argument is sound, yet none of the conclusions is super-true.) Locally, from the  
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it up with the thought that vagueness is ultimately a modal phenomenon, as Dever 
et al. 2004 have argued. But I have also pointed out that the notion of α-validity is 
reasonable in its own right, both with respect to type-(1) precisifications and with 
respect to type-(2) precisifications (at least insofar as these are construed in con-
formity to options (a) and (i), i.e., as forming a cluster of completely precise lan-
guages or interpretations that truly and fully define our vague language). So let 
me conclude with a general consideration to the effect that there is in fact a good 
reason to focus primarily on this notion of argument validity from a general su-
pervaluationary perspective.  
In a nutshell, the reason is simply that α-validity, which is fully classical and 
yet sensitive to vagueness of any order, allows us to recast global validity as a de-
fined notion. For let us introduce two operators T and F to express super-truth and 
super-falsity, respectively, with the obvious semantics: Tφ is true on a precisifica-
tion if and only if φ is true on every precisification, and Fφ is true on a precisifica-
tion if and only if φ is false on every precisification. Evidently both operators sat-
isfy all the axioms of the modal logic S5, so there is no room for non-trivial itera-
tions. But that’s fine: there may be indeterminacy as to what qualifies as the cor-
rect precisification space, yet relative to any precisification space super-truth and 
super-falsity are perfectly precise, though not exhaustive. Using these operators, 
we can then recast each notion of global validity via the following equivalences:38 
[32] Σ |=A Γ if and only if {Tφ: φ ∈ Σ} |=α {Tψ: ψ ∈ Γ} 
[33] Σ |=B Γ if and only if {Fψ: ψ ∈ Γ} |=α {Fφ: φ ∈ Σ} 
[34] Σ |=C Γ if and only if {Tφ: φ ∈ Σ} |=α {¬Fψ: ψ ∈ Γ} 
[35] Σ |=D Γ if and only if {¬Tψ: ψ ∈ Γ} |=α {Fφ: φ ∈ Σ}. 
In fact, we can recast the collective notions of validity, too. That would be 
straightforward if the language contained infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions, 
but even with the resources of a standard grammar we can easily do the job in 
view of the following equivalences: 
[36] Σ |=X Γ if and only if {T(φ1 ∧ … ∧ φn): n > 0 and φ1, …, φn ∈ Σ} 
|=α {T(ψ1 ∨ … ∨ ψn): n > 0 and ψ1, …, ψn ∈ Γ}. 
[37] Σ |=Y Γ if and only if {F(ψ1 ∨ … ∨ ψn): n > 0 and ψ1, …, ψn ∈ Γ} 
|=α {F(φ1 ∧ … ∧ φn): n > 0 and φ1, …, φn ∈ Σ}. 
                                                
truth of the premises we can infer that all precisifications verify some conclusion, not that some 
conclusion is verified by all precisifications. (Thanks to Robert Williams for raising this point.) 
38 The equivalence in [32], hence the possibility of defining global, truth-preserving validity 
in terms of local validity, is also pointed out in Dever et al. 2004, Sect. 3.2, and in Shapiro 2006, 
Ch. 4, Theorem 16.  
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So there is a clear sense in which settling on α-validity does not amount to ne-
glecting the other notions. On the contrary, each ‘|= i’ may be fully expressed in 
term of ‘|= α’. If desired, at this point we could even go further. We could make 
room for many other notions along the same lines, obtained from [32]–[37] by 
replacing ‘T’ with ‘D’, or with ‘Dn’, or with ‘D*’, and ‘F’ with ‘D¬’, ‘Dn¬’, 
or ‘D*¬’, respectively. And we could make room for a variety of corresponding 
notions even if we worked with (b)(ii)-style precisifications, focusing on a D 
operator characterized semantically in conformity with the second option men-
tioned at the end of section 1, that is, in analogy to the actuality operator of modal 
logic.  
Of course, conceptual reduction is no big deal. After all, all notions of valid-
ity are already defined in terms of one same basic concept—precisification. It is 
nonetheless significant to be able to keep track of all these notions in the object 
language, liar paradox permitting. And it is important to be able to do so in terms 
of a single reading of ‘|=’ that (i) captures both the truth-preserving and the fal-
sity-avoiding features of the classical notion of validity, (ii) is not open to the ob-
jection from higher-order vagueness, and (iii) is fully classical. In discussing the 
availability of distinct notions of validity within the same supervaluationary 
framework (specifically the notions corresponding to A-, C-, and α-validity), 
Keefe has recommended a pluralist attitude: even granting the normative aspect of 
our intuitive conception of validity, the question of whether we should endorse an 
argument ‘may itself be ambiguous or somewhat indeterminate—what we should 
endorse can depend on our purposes’ (2000b, p. 103). With reference to the alter-
native between A- and C-validity, for example, Keefe observes that although we 
are typically concerned to infer truths from truths (so that A-validity would be 
appropriate), there may be contexts, such as legal contexts, in which our main 
concern is rather to avoid inferring falsehoods (so that C-validity would be better 
suited). Indeed, the failure of transitivity may even be a welcome feature when it 
comes to the latter sort of context: the sorites paradox may itself be construed as a 
context in which we want to avoid inferring a falsehood, and its paradoxical na-
ture stems precisely from the fact that we are inclined to endorse each individual 
step without endorsing the big jump from the initial premise to the final conclu-
sion. Likewise, concerning the choice between global validity (of type A or C) 
and local validity (of type α), Keefe observes that precisely because the conflict 
arises only in the presence of the D operator and similar devices, at least relative 
to single-conclusion arguments, the choice among the options is not up for grabs. 
An inference in the form of D-introduction, for instance, is globally but not lo-
cally valid, but that’s because it sets a context in which the local reading is not 
plausible: it would be a mistake to portray such an inference as one that may fail 
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on certain ways of disambiguating it, that is, ways of resolving semantic indeci-
sion; for if it were decided that φ is true, Dφ could not remain false. This does not 
help us choose between global and local validity, but it suggests that D-enriched 
arguments are not effectively interpreted in terms of ambiguity or semantic inde-
cision, so the global reading appears to be better suited. On the other hand, I have 
mentioned earlier that in some cases the local reading seems better, for instance 
when we wish to reason under hypotheses that are not super-true: we may want to 
argue that the assumption that x is small, together with the fact that y’s height is 
less than x’s, entails that y must be small, too. Local reasonings of this sort reflect 
the penumbral principles that constrain the notion of an admissible precisification, 
so in a way they do not establish those principles on pain of circularity. But that is 
not to deny that we may find ourselves reasoning along such lines. 
I don’t have anything against this sort of pluralism. In principle, however, I 
am more sympathetic to a pluralism that stems from an ambiguity in our intuitive 
notion of a possible context (as JC Beall and Greg Restall 2000 have empha-
sized39) rather than from an ambiguity in the normative aspect of our intuitive no-
tion of validity. If there are ambiguities in the latter sense, we should welcome the 
opportunity to resolve them explicitly in the object language, by suitably repre-
senting the logical forms of our arguments. And that is precisely the value of the 
reduction afforded by [32]–[37]. Let us fix on one notion of validity, α-validity. If 
we want our argument to be read globally in the A-sense, let’s phrase it accord-
ingly, with the help of the T operator. If we want it to be read globally in the C-
sense, let us phrase it accordingly. And so on. This strikes me as a better way of 
handling any potential pragmatic tension that may arise from the multiplicity of 
purposes with which we can put forward an argument. Keefe is right in saying 
that insofar as we can define a notion of validity that is preservation of super-
valuational truth, namely global A-validity, it may look unwarranted to identify 
supervaluational validity with something else, namely local α-validity. Yet what 
looks unwarranted may not be so. Insofar as we can express A-validity in terms of 
α-validity, and insofar as the latter is perfectly classical, there are indeed good 
reasons to settle on that notion and avoid the fogs of pluralism. 
Let me conclude, then, with a general remark concerning the T operator. The 
reduction afforded by [32]–[37] depends on the availability of this operator in the 
object language, which is how super-truth enters the picture, so something must 
be said about it. I have said that its logic is S5. But there is more. Supervaluation-
ally, truth is not disquotational. As Williamson (1994, p. 162) famously argued, if 
                                                
39 In fact, my views on the matter are more radical than Beall and Restall’s, but this is not 
the place to elaborate. See Varzi 2002. 
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it were, then the supervaluationist would be forced to admit bivalence, since the 
following argument form is supervaluationally valid: 
[38] ψ ↔ Tψ, ¬ψ ↔ T¬ψ |= Tψ ∨ T¬ψ. 
In fact, inspection shows that [38] is valid on every reading of ‘|=’, though it may 
be difficult to prove that it is using classical rules of inference (for instance, stan-
dardly one appeals to proof by cases and transitivity, and these rules are invalid 
on the A- and X- readings of ‘|=’ and on the C- reading, respectively). However, 
in the present context the relevant sense of validity is clearly the truth-preserving 
sense: to say that [38] would force a supervaluationist to ‘admit bivalence’ is to 
say that accepting the premises as true would commit her to accepting the conclu-
sion as true. So really it is only the A-, α-, and X- readings of ‘|=’ that are relevant 
here. And on these readings, Williamson’s diagnosis is correct: supervaluationally 
we are inclined to reject the conclusion (and claim failure of bivalence) when ψ is 
indeterminate, and in those cases the two premises corresponding to Tarski’s 
schema are not super-true but indeterminate. Williamson’s takes this to be a bad 
thing, since he regards the disquotational property to be central to any respectable 
notion of truth, and the supervaluationist owes a response.  
Now, with regard to the A-reading, the popular response is well known: the 
loss of  
[39] Tφ ↔ φ 
is compensated by the upholding of the equivalence 
[40] Tφ –| |– φ, 
and for a supervaluationist it is this equivalence that—pace Williamson—captures 
the essence of the Tarskian intuition.40 In other words, T is not disquotational, but 
it still correlates in the appropriate way with the statements it applies to. I accept 
this line of response. Indeed, for what it’s worth, it is obvious that the response 
applies also on the collective, X-based conception of argument validity, which in 
this case coincides with the A-based conception. It does not, however, apply on 
the local conception, since on that reading the right-to-left direction of [40] may 
fail when φ is indeterminate. On the local reading both [39] and [40] may fail, and 
that is something one may worry about. Does it mean that going local forces us to 
give up the Tarskian intuition altogether? 
                                                
40 Compare Keefe 2000a, Sect. 8.3. Independently of supervaluationary insights, McGee 
(1989) argues that it is indeed entailment relations that do the work to which our intuitive notion 
of truth is typically put. 
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Not quite. The local reading—we have said—corresponds to a twofold idea, 
depending on whether we think of precisifications according to option (1), as 
forming the cluster of languages that we normally construe as a single vague lan-
guage, or according to option (2), as forming the cluster of interpretations that are 
compatible with the explicit semantic decisions characterizing our vague lan-
guage. Consider first option (1). In that case, the rationale behind α-validity rests 
on the idea of systematic disambiguation: just as assessing the truth of a statement 
amounts to checking whether it is true no matter how we systematically disam-
biguate it, that is, no matter how we consider one of the many languages that we 
may be speaking, so assessing the validity of an argument amounts to checking 
whether it is valid no matter how we systematically disambiguate its premises and 
conclusions. Now, we have just seen that when the D operator is involved, it may 
be misleading to consider disambiguations in which the meaning of D is kept 
fixed: if we were speaking a language in which φ is true, we might want to say 
that in that language Dφ is also true, regardless of φ’s truth value in other lan-
guages of the cluster. This suggests that there are two ways in which we can lo-
cally assess our statement, or argument: one on which ‘D’ has the meaning it has 
in our vague language, and another in which the meaning of ‘D’ is adapted to the 
context of our disambiguating scenario. On the former understanding, D-intro-
duction fails. On the latter, D-introduction is irrelevant because we are actually 
treating D itself as a vague operator—we are thinking of D as an operator whose 
behaviour changes depending on the language we speak, and whose semantics is 
fixed, not by the rule in [41], but by the rule in [42]: 
[41] Dφ is true on a precisification P if and only if φ is true on all precisi-
fications accessible from P. 
[42] Dφ is true on a precisification P if and only if φ is true on P. 
Well, then: the same sort of consideration can be applied to statements or argu-
ments involving the T operator. Generally speaking, ‘T’ stands for ‘it is super-true 
that’, and we can have good use for such an operator. Among other things, we 
need it to implement the reductive definitions in [32]–[37]. Nonetheless, when it 
comes to evaluating a statement or an argument in which some claims are said to 
be true, we should pay attention to the sense in which ‘true’ is being used. One 
sense is captured by the supervaluational semantics for ‘T’, as per the condition in 
[43] that we have been assuming so far. Another sense is the local one, captured 
by the condition in [44]: 
[43] Tφ is true on a precisification P if and only if φ is true on all precisi-
fications. 
[44] Tφ is true on a precisification P if and only if φ is true on P. 
36 
On their local reading, T and D would reduce to the same operator, and plausibly 
so, since bivalence holds on every precisification. Accordingly, let us write ‘’ 
to indicate such an operator, as fixed by [42] or [44]. (Effectively, this is the op-
erator corresponding to Fine’s ‘trueT’, 1975, pp. 148f.) Then the idea is that on the 
second understanding of how we can go about assessing a statement φ or a whole 
argument Σ |– Γ, we do so upon reading it as involving   rather than T. Depend-
ing on which language we are speaking, certain statements would be true and oth-
ers false in that language, so if φ or any element of Σ ∪ Γ contains the T operator, 
we should disambiguate it by replacing ‘T’ with ‘’: disambiguation may require 
some adjustments in logical form. So, now, when it comes to statements of the 
form [39] or arguments of the form [40]—the statements and arguments that puta-
tively reflect the Tarskian intuition—there are two ways of assessing them. We 
can assess them as being about truth qua super-truth, or we can understand them 
as being about local or regimented truth. In the former case, both fail to hold 
when φ is indeterminate, for super-truth dissolves in the context of a single dis-
ambiguated language; in the latter case, however, both hold unrestrictedly. In 
other words, the following are both α-valid: 
[45] φ ↔ φ 
[46] φ –| |– φ 
If we construe precisifications according to option (2), the story is slightly 
different but the moral is the same. On that construal, we are supposed to interpret 
our vague language by means of a cluster of classical models, just as we interpret 
a modal language by means of a cluster of possible worlds, and the T operator 
registers what is true in every model of the cluster. Again, it is obvious that [39] 
and [40] may fail on this picture. However, we can certainly enrich our language 
with the   operator, to keep track of what is true and what is false in the individ-
ual models. In particular, we may want to keep track of the fact that every admis-
sible model is perfectly standard, hence bivalent—a fact that we certainly cannot 
express by uttering the law of the excluded middle, or by uttering the principle of 
bivalence using D or T. So, again, when it comes to assessing a statement or an 
argument, we must distinguish between the global—as we may now call it—or 
the local sense in which we use such phrases as ‘is it definitely the case that’ or ‘it 
is true that’. If we go for the global sense, then these phrases correspond to D and 
T, since we are interested in super-truth and global validity. But if we go for the 
local sense, then we should go for : surely a standard model is one relative to 
which such phrases cancel out.  
So, yes, super-truth fails to be disquotational on a supervaluationary logic in 
which validity is α-validity, both in the stronger sense expressed by Tarski’s bi-
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conditional [39] and in the weaker sense expressed by the equivalence in [40]. 
But this is not to say that on such a logic we are giving up the disquotational intui-
tion altogether. In fact, I have presented the picture as one involving an ambiguity 
between two notions of truth, only one of which is disquotational. That may 
sound cheap; it may sound like a concession to the sort of pluralism that I have 
discouraged with respect to the notion of validity. But that was just to fix the in-
tuition. It should be clear that on this picture we can ultimately express the ambi-
guity directly in the object language, just as we can express any potential ambigu-
ity of the notion of validity. So let me summarize the picture by rephrasing it as 
follows. Forget about T. What is crucial, if we want to argue about truth, is that 
our language contains the   operator—and this is perfectly disquotational. The T 
operator is only needed to endow such arguments with global or collective read-
ings. And surely that is only possible if T does not cancel out. That is why [40] 
cannot be locally valid. What is valid, as we know, is the global reading of [40], 
which is to say its A-reading. And this remains true. For once recast via [32], the 
A-reading of [40] amounts to the following claim: 
[47] TTφ –| |– Tφ. 
And this claim is perfectly (and trivially) α-valid.41 
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